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I. SOME EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF PROPERTY.
1. Eminent Domain.
THE law of all nations -has always recognised the right of the
sovereign power to take private property from the owner, under
certain conditions: Vattel, sect. 244; Grotius, bk. III., c. 20, s.
VII.; Puffendorf, bk. VIII, ch. V., VII. This is called the
right of eminent domain.
The conditions of its exercise are two in number, first, that the
taking shall be for public use: 2 Kent's Com. 340; Grotius, ubz
supra; and secondly, that compensation shall be provided: 2
Kent's Com. 339; 1 Bl. Com. 139; Grotius, ubi supra; Puffen-
dorf, ubi supra. The right of compensation, says STORY, "is
founded in natural equity, and is laid down by jurists as a principle
of universal law: Const., sect. 1790. The common law from the
earliest days has upheld it. It is guaranteed in the Magna Charta,
and again in the Petition of Right. So sacred did it seem to the
fathers of our republic that it ,was included in the Bill of Rights
adopted almost contemporaneously with our Constitution. The
fifth article in the Bill of Rights provides that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
Most of the states of the Union have affirmed the same principle
in their constitutions, and even where no such written guarantee
was given, the Supreme Court of Georgia, saying that "the sacred-
ness of property ought not to be confided to the uncertain virtue
of those who govern," held a law invalid which proposed to take
the property of a private citizen for a public roadway, without any
compensation: Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 348. Under this fun-
damental provision it has been held either that the compensation
must be provided before the taking, or that the means of compen-
sation must be made certain; but some states, believing that the
right of private property ought to be still more secure, have
expressly excluded this latter alternative: 1 Bl. Com. 139, note
17, by Cooley; Sedgwick on Constr. of Stat. and Const. Law, 2d
,ed., 468.
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2. The right of necessity.
A second exception to the exclusive right of property is recog-
nised by the law of nature and of nations (Puffend., bk. VII, c. V.,
VII.), an exception expressed by the common-law maxim, "neces-
Bitas inzducit privilegium quoad jura privata" : Broom's Legal
Maxims 11. "If a man, who is assaulted and in danger of his life,
run through the close of another without keeping in a fbotpath, an
action of trespass does not lie, because the doing of this, it being
necessary for the preservation of his life, is lawful :" 9 Bac. Abr.
480. Where a road is out of repair, a traveller may go upon
private property; in time of fire, houses may be pulled down to
prevent the spread of the fire; and the books give other instances
"It is a right not susceptible of any precise definition, for the
mode and manner and extent of its exercise, must depend upon the
nature and degree of necessity that calls it into action, and this
cannot be determined until the necessity is made to appear :"
Hale v. Lawrence, 1 Zabr. (N. J.) 729.
Besides these instances of the invasion of the rights of property
by private individuals, where necessity becomes a higher law than
the property rights of others, many cases arise in which a public
officer, acting on behalf of the government, has equal or greater
privileges: Mitchell v. Hfarmony, 13 How. 184; 9 Bac. Abr.
483.
It is war, called by a learned moral writer, "an abrogation of
the ten commandments," which to some extent abrogates the law
too, and the necessity of the hour becomes supreme. A military
officer, on a march with famished troops, has no time to have the
price of provisions, stored near by, assessed by a jury. On a
hasty march, with the enemy at hand, an army cannot stop to
decide how much shall be paid and to whom, for property which
the retreating army cannot take, and the enemy must not have.
And public law has always decreed that in these cases the necessity
makes the law; the individual is despoiled; the safety of the peo-
ple demands it: Vattel, sect. 121; Puffendorf, bk. VIII., ch. V.,
VII.
It will be readily seen, that the right of a public officer to seize
or destroy private property, under an inevitable necessity in war,
resembles both the ordinary private right of necessity, and the
right of eminent domain. It is like the first, in the fact that no
compensation need be tendered, nor even the means of compensa-
tion be made certain. It is like the second, in that the seizure or
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destruction is by public agents directly for public purposes, as
much so as where land is taken for a public building. And in this
respect, it is unlike the first, for it is always difficult to tell for
whose benefit the private right of necessity is exercised: American
Print Works v. Lawrence, 1 Zabr. 257. Sometimes it is -for the
advantage of the individual exercising it, sometimes for a limited
number of persons; nearly always, the element of public policy
attends the right.
It is a mere corollary to add, that when property is thus taken
in case of necessity, the officer who acts on behalf of the govern-
ment is under no liability to the owner. No tort is committed;
and he cannot be held on any contract, for he is a mere public
agent acting openly and within his rightful authority. If the
owner has any remedy, it must, then, be against the government.
He has certainly suffered loss. Is he without remedy? If he has
a remedy, on what principles does it rest? Where must he seek
it ? These are the questions now to be considered.
II. SuITs AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.
Under the civil law, the sovereign is liable to suit like any pri-
vate individual, whether the action be upon contract or in tort:
Brown's Case, 6 Court of Claims 192. By the common law the
government cannot be sued except by its own consent. In Eng-
land the proceeding by petition of right was enlarged and ex-
tended by stat. 23 & 24 Vict., and now is nearly as extensive
as the civil-law proceeding against the sovereign: Brown's Case,
supra. In the United States, the crying evil of the exemption of
the government from suit, was remedied in part, in 1855, by the
passage of the act establishing the Court of Claims: 10 Stat. 612.
Jurisdiction was given this court to "hear and determine all claims
founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied,
with the government of the United States."
By the Act of July 4th 1864, the remedy in the Court of Claims
was taken away in all "claims against the United States growing
out of the destruction or appropriation of, or damage to property
by the army or navy, or any part of the army or navy engaged in
the suppression of the rebellion, from the commencement to the
close thereof:" 13 Stat. 381. This limitation, being confined to
the late rebellion, leaves the jurisdiction of this court unimpaired
as to causes of action arising out of any other war.
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Rights which, after the formation of this court, are legally
enforceable, existed before its formation; but, in the language of
public law, only as "imperfect rights," or "moral claims :" Wool-
sey Int. Law, sect. 16. And this is the nature of all rights arising
out of the destruction or appropriation of property in the late war
by the Federal army or navy.
The obligation of such rights is like the obligation upon an
individual of a contract, not in writing, within the Statute of
Frauds. The overruling moral law, in either case, imposes an
obligation upon the public or private conscience, although neither
obligation can be enforced in any court. Where this moral obli-
gation is upon the government, there may be also a provision of
the supreme constitutional law recognising it; but if the legislature
refuses to create a forum, the individual has no judicial remedy.
No action in tort is maintainable against the government in the
Court of Claims: Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 345.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF COMPENSATION
FOR PROPERTY TAKEN UNDER NECESSITY.
The fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution of the
United States reads as follows: "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service
in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled, in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation."
It is said that the last clause of this article does not oblige the
government to pay for property taken by a public agent, under an
inevitable necessity in time of war; and that it applies solely to
the right of eminent domain, exercised in time of peace.
A consideration of the reason and the authorities compels me to
disagree with this view, and to believe that property taken iii war,
for the public benefit, is "property taken for public use," within
the constitutional provision. It has been seen that unlike the rule
in time of peace, the compensation in time of war need not be
previously tendered, nor the means of compensation even be made
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certain; but this need not exclude the obligation of a future just
compensation.
The question of payment may be complicated by the fact that
the property is situated in the enemy's country; or is taken 
from
a citizen of that country; or in a civil war, from a disloyal citizen;
or by the other circumstances of the taking. Laying aside 
these
complications, this discussion will be confined to the question, 
does
the constitutional provision, requiring compensation for 
"private
property taken for public use," include property taken 
in war
under an inevitable necessity?
1. It is argued that the clause refers to the right of eminent
domain, and not to the taking of private property under 
an
inevitable necessity; that following the analogous privilege 
of
individuals in overruling necessity, the government is under 
no
obligation to reimburse the individual loser. The argument 
is
founded on a distinction of mere words. The very point 
of
resemblance between a taking of private property by the right 
of
eminent domain in peace, and under a public necessity in war, 
is
the vital and central point-that in both cases, the property 
is
taken for public use. This is the reason, in the one case, why
compensation must be made-it is equally forcible in the other.
To say that private property, taken under a charter of a railroad
corporation for the benefit of comparatively few travellers, is taken
for public use, and to deny that term, when property is taken 
for
the nation's highest necessities by a public officer, is to deny to the
plainest words their clearest meaning. The necessity permits, 
it
is true, the suspension of payment, but the taking creates an obli-
gation to pay.
2. It is said, secondly, that this article and others in the Bill
of Rights have no application whatever in time of war, and that
the guarantees of civil rights in the Constitution are not binding
except in time of peace.
It cannot be questioned that with the adoption of the Con-
stitution, giving to Congress the power to declare war, and to the
president the command and direction of the military forces, the
international laws of war were also adopted, as a part of the Con-
stitution, necessary to its preservation. Thus, in a district where
the civil courts are closed, trials may be conducted by the military
courts organized for such purposes under the laws of war: The
Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 133; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176.
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There is no question that when the necessities of war require it, a
peaceful citizen may be deprived of his property, with no process
of law other than the issuance of the command of an officer and an
immediate seizure by a squad of armed soldiers. Our military
cemeteries are a sad record of men deprived of life, without an
indictment, without a trial by jury, without assistance of counsel,
without witnesses on either side. Yet no one can contend that all
these violations of the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are otherwise than lawful, because done in war, under a
sanction of laws recognised in the Constitution as. suspending its
provisions.
But how far does this suspension go ? Wbat bounds are to be
set to it ? The Supreme Court of the United States in the great
case, Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 127 (DAVIS, J.), speak as follows
in regard to the operation of martial law. Their language equally
applies to the present subject of discussion. "It follows that there
are occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If in.
foreign invasion, or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and
it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then,
on the theatre of active military operations, where war really
prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil
authority thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and
society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to
govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course.
As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for if this
government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a
gross usurpation of power."
The line here is distinctly drawn. Necessity causes the suspen-
sion of the constitutional guarantees, but when the necessity ceases,
these provisions again resume their force. Necessity compels the
taking of private property for public use without giving compen-
sation at the time. The necessity extends no further. There is
no such overruling necessity that the property shall not be paid
for, on demand to the proper authorities. With the taking of the
property arises an implied contract on the part of the government
to compensate the owner when opportunity offers, when the over-
ruling necessity ceases. The laws and the necessities of war are
in no conflict with this obligation.
" The Constitution of the United States," says Mr. Justice
DAvis, in the case already referred to (Ex parte Millian, supra),.
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" is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
-covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more
pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man, than
that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly
to anarchy or despotism; but the theory of necessity on which it
is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has
all the powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its
existence."
3. A third objection is urged, that if the obligation of the gov-
ernment for losses in war were admitted, then the public treasury
would become impoverished, and even exhausted. The principle
of overruling necessity is stretched so that it may cover times of
peace as well as times of war. We are told that a wide exception
is to be judicially inserted in the Constitution upon very doubtful
grounds of policy.
The argument from public policy is in this case purely political.
When the words of a statute are doubtful, public policy may decide
the undetermined scale; but otherwise, it has no place in a judi-
cial or legal decision. A departure from the plain ways of legal
interpretation and construction into these uncertain paths is to mis-
take the province of the judge; it is to make him a legislator.
"Ia lex sr pta e8t," can be the only judicial answer in such a
case.
The federal legislature has passed upon the expediency of allow-
ing a judicial decision upon claims against the United States aris-
ing out of the late civil war. In the midst of that great struggle,
it took away the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, as we have
already seen, over claims for the destruction or appropriation
of, or damage to property in that war. (July 4th 1864, 13
Stat. 381.) What may be, and may already have been, the effect
of this avoidance of a legal obligation upon the morals and patriot-
ism of the country, is not a subject to be considered in a purely
legal discussion.
IV. DIRECT JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES.
The authorities directly bearing upon the subject of compensa-
tion for property used or destroyed in war, under an inevitable
necessity, are very few. There is but one systematic treatise on
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the subject, to my knowledge-a report to the House of Represen-
tatives, by the Hon. William Lawrence, on behalf of the Commit-
tee on War Claims, 43d Congress, 1st Session, March 1874, Rep.
No. 262, in greater part republished in the 13 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.), pp. 265, 337, 401, and afterwards re-issued by authority
of Congress, in permanent form. In his work on "1 War Powers
under the Constitution," the Hon. William Whiting barely glances
at the subject. Five decisions and five dicta are all the direct
judicial expressions that reward a careful search in the American
and English reports. The reason is clear. Our late civil war is
the only recent war where the necessities have been so great and1
so pressing as to force a government frequently to take the pro-
perty of its own citizens, without compensation at the time; and
Congress, as we have seen, withdrew jurisdiction from the Court
of Claims, as to that war.
Two decided cases and two dicta are cited to show that the
government is not liable for property "taken for public use," in
time of war. Rightly considered, I believe that only one furnishes
authority for this view.
In the Saltpetre Case, 12 Rep. 12, it was considered justi-
fiable, on the ground of overruling necessity in time of threat-
ened war, for the servants of the Crown to go upon private land
and dig and carry away saltpetre for use in making gunpowder.
No question appears to have been raised as to compensation, but
the decision seems to imply that none ought to be made. The
only value of this case, at the present day, is to show what
was then adjudged to be the law. As an authority, it is of no
value whatever. The rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in M_4itchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 134, is directly
opposed to the idea of this case. "The danger must be immedi-
ate and impending, or the necessity urgent for the public service,
such as will not admit of delay, and where the action of the civil
authority would be too late in providing the means which the occa-
sion calls for. "Extreme necessity alone," say the Supreme Court
of Georgia, "can justify these cases and all others occupying the
same ground:" .Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 349. The rights of
the government in republican America are not to be measured by
the royal prerogative in the days of the Stuarts.
In the case of Governor & Company of British Cast -Plate Manu-
facturers v. .41eredith (an action against a paving commissioner
VOL. 'XXIX.-30
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under an Act of Parliament, for damages from the raising of a
roadway, 4 Term Rep. 794), Mr. Justice BULLER says (p. 797):
"There are many cases in which individuals sustain an injury, for
which the law gives no action; for instance, pulling down houses
or raising bulwarks for the preservation of the kingdom against the
king's enemies. The civil-law writers, indeed, say that the indi-
viduals who suffer have a right to resort to the public for a satis-
faction; but no one ever thought that the common law gave an
action against the individual who pulled down the house, &c. This
is one of those cases to which the maxim applies, salus populi
u prema lex. If the thing complained of were lawful at the time,
no action can be sustained against the party doing the act." This
does not deny an imperfect right, an equitable claim for compensa-
tion against the government where property is taken or destroyed
for the public good. It merely denies that any action is given
at common law, a position which no one has ever attempted to
question.
A dictum in the early case of Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 348,
seems to admit the justice of claims for damages in war, but denies
a right of suit against the sovereignty, which indeed did not exist
at that time. "It is not to be doubted but that there are cases in
which private property may be taken for a public use without the
consent of the owner, and without compensation and without any
provision of law for making compensation. These are cases of
urgent public necessity, which no law has anticipated and which
cannot await the action of the legislature. In such cases, the
injured individual has no redress at law; those who seize his pro-
perty are not trespassers, and there is no relief for him but by
petition to the legislature. For example: the pulling down houses
and raising bulwarks for the defence of the state against an
enemy; seizing corn and other provisions for the sustenance of an
army in time of war, or taking cotton-bags, as General Jackson
did at New Orleans, to build ramparts against an invading foe."
There is no denial here whatever of the existence of an obligation
on the part of the government thus benefited-a duty-to recom-
pense the individuals; no denial that the property taken under
necessity is "taken for public use," within the constitutional prin-
ciple, but a mere assertion of that which "is not to be doubted,"
that the necessity releases from the obligation of present payment
and that the owner had no redress, at law, at that time.
WAR CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY.
The last and the strongest judicial expression cited to show that
no liability on the part of the government exists, in such cases, is
the decision in the case of 1?espublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 383.
During the Revolution, the city of Philadelphia was threatened. To
prevent provisions from falling into the hands of the British troops,
the Board of War ordered the removal of both public and private
property to Chestnut Hill, a safer place. The enemy, however,
took both Philadelphia and the supply depot at Chestnut Hill.
Among the goods removed there and captured, were two hundred
and twenty-seven barrels of flour, belonging to Sparhawk. He
exhibited an account to the comptroller-general, for the value,
under a statute providing this mode of settlement of claims, "for
services rendered, moneys advanced, or articles furnished by order
of the legislative or executive power." The decision of that officer
was xdverse and an appeal was taken (as provided by statute), to
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The decision of the comp-
troller-general was there affirmed on two grounds : first, that the
claimant ought not to receive compensation upon the principles of
law, and secondly, that under the statute just quoted, the court
had no jurisdiction of the claim. After showing that the officers
were not liable for the trespass, the court say (p. 388) : "We are
clearly of opinion that Congress might lawfully direct the removal
of any articles that were necessary to the maintenance of the con-
tinental army, or useful to the enemy, and in danger of falling into
their hands; for they were vested with the powers of peace and
war, to which this was a natural and necessary incident: and hav-
ing done it lawfully, there is nothing in the circumstances of the
case which, we think, entitles the appellant to a compensation for
the consequent loss." It must, however, be noticed that to decide
secondly, that the court had no jurisdiction of the case, greatly
lessens the weight of its opinion on the merits, reducing it towards
the level of a mere dictum. This completes the examination of
judicial expressions which may be cited to show that property
appropriated or destroyed in war is not within the constitutional
provision of compensation.
A brief reference to the recent case of Langford v. The United
States, 12 Court of Claims 338; 101 U. S. 341, may here be
thought necessary. The facts shown are, that the American Board
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (who afterward assigned their
title to the claimant) occupied land in Washington Territory, claim-
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ing title thereto. They were forcibly dispossessed by the United
States forces, under direction of the Secretaries of War and the
Interior, and the lands and the buildings thereon were used as an
Indian agency; the United States claiming to hold under a para-
mount title. The Supreme Court rendered judgment for the United
States, on the ground that the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction,
saying (p. 342): " Conceding that the title, or even the right to
the possession of the premises, was in claimant, it would seem that
the facts above stated show that the act of the United States, in
taking possession was an unequivocal tort, if the government can be
capable of committing one, and that if the case were between indi-
viduals every implication of a contract would be repelled." Then
the court add (p. 343): "We are not called upon to decide that
when the government, acting by the forms which are sufficient to
bind it, recognises the fact that it is taking _private property for
public use, the compensation may not be recovered in the Court
of Claims. On this point, we decide nothing." Where private
property is taken in war, under an inevitable necessity, there is no
tort and the government does not deny that it is private property.
As to this, the case cited "decides nothing," and can have no
bearing on the present discussion.
On the other side, favoring compensation, are three dicta and two
direct decisions.
In the case of the Mayor, &c., of New York v. Lord, 17
Wend. 291, NELSON, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of New York, says: "If the public necessity in
fact exists, the act is lawful. Thus, houses may be pulled down
or bulwarks raised for the defence and preservation of the country,
without subjecting the persons concerned to an action, the same as
pulling down houses in time of fire; and yet these are common
cases where the sufferers would be entitled to compensation from
the national government within the constitutional principle."
In the Court of Errors of New York, PORTER, Senator, says,
(Russell v. The Mayor, fte., of New York, 2 Denio 483): "I
apprehend that the constitutional limitation was not designed for,
and should not be extended to any such case," (that of pulling
down houses to prevent the spread of fire); "but that the clause
has reference only to cases where the property of an individual is
taken for some public benefit or advantage. A vessel may, in
time of war, be taken from the owner when the interest of the
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public demands it; or it may be destroyed to prevent its falling
into the hands of the enemy, and thereby increase its power of
aggression or resistance; and the owner would be entitled upon
this principle of the Constitution to be paid a just compensation.
Nothing could more clearly support the proposition advanced
than these two dicta. They are found in cases belonging to the
same series, growing out of the great fire in New York in the year
1835-cases involving immense sums of money and which were
argued and considered with the greatest care.
The case of Xitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, was an action
by a trader (defendant in error), against a lieutenant colonel in
the United States army. Harmony had made an extensive out-
lay of money and had gone into New Mexico intending to estab-
lish trade with the inhabitants. Mitchell compelled the trader,
who had found a desirable location and wished to stop, to accom-
pany the army on a farther expedition of four hundred miles,
justifying his action by maintaining the illegality of Harmony's
intentions and the necessity of the supplies to the army. The
expedition ended disastrously and the property of Harmony fell
into the enemy's hands. An action was brought against Mitchell
in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, and
a verdict rendered for the plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed
in the Supreme Conrt of the United States, and in delivering the
opinion of the court, Mr. Chief Justice TANEY "made use of the
following language (p. 134): "There are without doubt occasions
in which private property may lawfully be taken possession of and
destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the public
enemy; and also, an officer, charged with a particular duty, may
impress private property into public service or take it for public
use. Uuquestionably in such cases, the government is bound to
make full compensation to the owner; but the officer is not a tres-
passser.
Following the not uncertain voice of this court, as expressed by
this great jurist, the Court of Claims in three successive cases,
the only ones involving this principle ever before that court, have
rendered judgment for the claimants. These are the cases of
Grant v. United States, 1 Court of Claims 41; Wiggins v. United
States, 3 Id. 412, and Campbell v. United States, 8 Id. 240.
Many other cases would undoubtedly have arisen had not Con-
gress, shortly after the first decision was rendered, as we have seen,
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withdrawn jurisdiction from the court in all such cases arising out
of our late war.
The case of Grant v. United States, supra, was an action
brought in 1863. William S. Grant was an army contractor,
owning large mills and storehouses at Tucson, Arizona, in which
was stored property belonging to himself and to the government.
In July 1861, the Texan rebel forces advanced in so large num-
bers that the United States army officers deemed it necessary to
withdraw. Before leaving, the mills and all the stores of Grant
were set on fire and destroyed to prevent their falling into the
hands of the enemy. The necessity for the act was proved in the
Court of Claims and judgment was given for the claimant for the
value of all his property so destroyed. The court say (p. 50) :
"We hold, in this case, that the property was destroyed by the
rightful order of the commanding officer, and upon an urgent and
pressing necessity, and to prevent it from falling into the hands of
the public enemy, and those hostile to the United States: that it
was a taking for public use; and that the government is bound
under the Constitution to make just compensation to the owner.
The legal duty to make compensation raises an implied promise to
do so; and here is found the jurisdiction of this court to entertain
this proceeding."
The case of Wiggins v. United States, supra, arose out of
the bombardment of Greytown or San Juan, in Central America
in 1854. The robbers and cut-throats who made this town their
home constantly maltreated citizens of the United States who
debarked there on their way to California, and finally assaulted a
United States consul and a minister to one of the South American
Republics. Reparation was demanded from the authorities by our
government and refused. The ship of war Cyane was then sent
there, with orders to ask again for reparation, and, if none was
given, to open on the town. No satisfaction was received and the
town was thereupon razed to the ground. Across the bay were
stores belonging to a Boston company and a quantity of gun-
powder belonging to Wiggins and others (assignees in bankruptcy),
citizens of the United States. Fearing that the inhabitants would
seize the powder and with it destroy the other stores, the naval
commander sunk it in the sea. The President subsequently rati-
fied the act. Wiggins and the other owners of the powder brought
suit against the United States in the Court of Claims, which held
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the government liable for the value of the powder. CASEY, C. J.,
delivered the opinion, saying (p. 422): "We do not see how this
case can be distinguished in principle from Grant v. United States,
supira. * * * * Judge WVILMOT reviews at length the grounds
of the claim, and the authorities bearing upon the subject, and
shows most clearly and conclusively that, whether the property be
taken and appropriated by right of Eminent domain, or destroyed
to prevent other or greater injury to the public, the party is
entitled to compensation; that this results as well from the princi-
ples of natural justice and equity as from the constitutional
injunction to make compensation for private possessions devoted to
public ends. We are entirely satisfied with the grounds there
n.:sumed, so far as they are applicable to the facts of this case, and
can add nothing to the cogency or conclusiveness of the reason-
Campbell's Case, supra, is similar to the two preceding cases.
The hull of a steamboat belonging to the petitioner was seized
in October 1861, by order of General Grant, and carried to
Cairo, to prevent its use by the Confederate forces, and was, in
consequence, lost to the owner. A special act (16 Stat. 668),
referred the case to the Court of Claims, which following its former
decisions, rendered judgment for the claimant. No appeal was
taken from this decision, nor do the questions of law appear to
have been strongly disputed, the contest being merely as to the
facts.
This completes the examination of the direct judicial authori-
ties bearing on the subject of discussion.
From the authorities cited and from the reason of the case, two
propositions can, I think, be considered established.
1. Property taken by proper authority under an inevitable
necessity in war is within the constitutional provision requiring
compensation.
2. Under the Court of Claims Act owners of such property
have a legally enforceable right against the United States
WILLIAM B. KING.
Washington, D. C.
